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  Abstract
This paper surveys theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence about the contributions of banks and security markets to
economic growth in the European Union. Its financial structure 
differs from that in the United States. While GDP in the Union is
slightly larger, banking assets are three times as large, stock
market capitalization is 60%, and corporate bond debt is 80% of
that in the U.S. 
These differences are attributed to the greater presence in
Europe of universal banking, pyramidal holding companies, and
government ownership of banking institutions and other firms. As
privatization proceeds, banking assets will continue to be
disproportionately large relative to the U.S., because both
universal banks and pyramidal holding companies in the context of
Roman law institutions reduce the attractiveness of equities.
Equities are both a claim on a future stream of net income and a
mechanism which can be used to control and restructure through
takeovers. The latter is largely missing in Europe and not likely
to develop without massive changes in industrial organization and
legal institutions. While market capitalization has been trending
up sharply in the two areas, both capitalization and trading
volumes in Europe are rising less rapidly than in the United
States.
Another reason for these trends is that with passage of
time, the size distribution of firms is becoming increasingly
skewed towards small firms in Europe relative to the United
States. Banks have a comparative advantage in serving small
firms.CREDIT FLOWS FROM BANKS AND CAPITAL MARKETS IN AN EVOLVING EUROPE
Donald D. Hester
  University of Wisconsin - Madison
I   Introduction:
The adoption of a single currency is a small but important
part of the evolution of a unified European financial market. A
single currency eliminates intra-European exchange rate varia-
tions. However, variations had been diminishing for the past
quarter century with the emergence of the "snake" and then the
European Monetary System and associated commitments to limit
fluctuations about a common weighted average of currencies. 
The gradual elimination of restrictions on intra-European
flows of capital has already changed and will continue to trans-
form financial markets radically. It is difficult to dispute Roy
C. Smith of New York University: "Indeed, these developments have
already changed the European securities industry more, perhaps,
than have any other broad environmental changes throughout its
long history." [Smith, 1997, p. 1]. Smith provides a valuable
analysis of "wholesale" finance, by which he means debt and
equity securities that are issued or traded in Europe. The
principle of "mutual recognition" is having a similarly dramatic
transforming effect on European banking regulation [Cf. Key,
1989]. 
The present paper contributes by examining how the ongoing
changes have affected and can be expected to continue to affect
credit markets. I am particularly interested in how the rate of
growth of real income is related to financial flows from banks
and security markets. Because all financial market innovations
have distributional consequences, I also discuss the effects of
change on the distributions of income and wealth. 
The discussion is unavoidably intricate and draws on much
existing research. It also is informed by important precedents
that can be observed in the United States. Changes and observable
practices in the United States do not necessarily define the path
that Europe will follow, although Smith [pp. 28-29] strongly
suggests that Europe has been drawing heavily on American experi-
ence. It illustrates arguments with observable changes in Italian
markets, but they are believed to apply broadly to the European
Union. The next section examines the effects of financial market
innovations and institutional change on the performance of credit
markets. The third compares the lending of banks with otherproviders of funds in credit markets and the fourth discusses
evidence about the relation between economic growth and flows
from banks and other providers. The conclusion summarizes the
findings and identifies questions for future research. 
II  Financial Market Innovations and Institutional Change:
Financial institutions facilitate the flows of funds from
individuals and firms with excess resources to others with a need
to borrow. Banks begin as depository institutions that are able
to lend temporarily idle funds at short term. Other financial
institutions traditionally have invested funds with a variety of
objectives and constraints. Universal banks to varying degrees
have portfolios that reflect the goals and constraints of a broad
set of intermediaries. As Barth, et al. [1997] has reported,
there is considerable heterogeneity in the range of activities
that banks may engage in across countries. In the European Union,
mutual recognition will tend to reduce but not eliminate this
heterogeneity. 
Brokers, underwriters, and other specialists in securities
markets have a different agenda; they try to bring together both
borrowers and lenders and profit from fees, spreads, and market
informational asymmetries. They differ from financial institu-
tions fundamentally because, apart from speculation, they attempt
to avoid assuming positions that make them vulnerable to time-
varying risks. This distinction has perhaps been most sharply
drawn in recent illuminating papers by Allen and Gale [1995,
1997] where they argue: "A market-based system promotes cross-
sectional risk sharing. An intermediary-based system promotes
intertemporal risk smoothing." [1995, p. 16]. In the real world
where transactions costs matter and information is endogenously
determined, but costly to acquire, the distinction blurs as has
been suggested by Grossman and Stiglitz [1976]. Essentially
speculation and market making are inseparable. Further, asset
positions have important time dimensions as gap analysis, immuni-
zation strategies, and the associated derivatives revolution
clearly illustrate.
When financial market innovations and institutional struc-
tures change, the distinction drawn by Allen and Gale is espe-
cially helpful. They argue in their 1995 paper that European
integration may not lead to an improvement in welfare if disin-
termediation occurs. Their argument draws on a model reported in
the 1997 paper, which uses an overlapping generations framework
with incomplete markets to study ex ante Pareto optimality. There
they show that in a mixed system with both a long-lived interme-
diary and a financial market with two assets, competition from
the financial market limits the contributions of the interme-diary. Thus, for example, disintermediation could cause Pareto
improving contributions of universal banks to be reduced if
Europe were to adopt a market-based system.
Further, as argued by Hakansson [1982] in a general equi-
librium framework, in pure market-based systems it is almost
inevitable that unanticipated financial market innovations are
not Pareto improving. Positions that were optimal before a
change, are not likely to be optimal afterwards because of wealth
(endowment) redistributions that accompany an innovation. This is
true even when innovations increase the extent to which states of
nature are spanned by assets. Change in and of itself will hurt
some individuals and firms.
Financial innovation is in part opportunistic. Innovators
look for voids in the limited set of assets offered in a market
and introduce a new asset or derivative instrument whenever the
expected return from the innovation exceeds some breakeven
threshold. Openings for new assets can be created by original
thinking, technical progress, changes in the scale or scope of
markets, and changes in regulatory environment. For example, with
reference to the Basel risk-based capital (RBC) requirements, a
recent Federal Reserve study reports: "Through securitization and
other financial innovations, many large banks have lowered their
RBC requirements substantially without reducing materially their
overall credit risk exposures." [1998, pp. 1-2] Both financial
intermediaries and nonintermediary credit market traders are
innovators. The stream of financial market innovations is likely
to run high in a period of structural change, such as Europe is
now experiencing.
How has change affected financial relations in Europe?
Trivially, because intra-European currency risk among the eleven
countries adopting the euro has disappeared, a large industry is
being wiped out. Banks played a large role in converting curren-
cies for individuals and firms; their importance in an economy
has been correspondingly diminished. Forward and currency futures
traders have taken a similar hit. 
The number of potential competitors in each member country
of the European Union has risen in all financial markets. Before
unification each institution could hide behind protective barri-
ers established by a country, just as inefficient state-chartered
unit banks in the U.S. could survive when branching was limited.
While the international amalgamation of banks appears to be
proceeding slowly, there is an increasing pace of mergers within
each country and an increasing forced realization of losses that
had been incurred by inefficient or corrupt banks. Thus the
number of competitors in local markets is changing, but not
necessarily diminishing. In Italy, for example, there has been anexplosion in the number of branches. Both in the U.S. and in
Italy, Herfindahl indices or concentration ratios appear to be
rising sharply at the national level, but only slowly if at all
at the local level [De Bonis, et al., 1998; Amel, 1996]. 
The effects of consolidation of banks on services provided
to consumers and firms are not well understood in the U.S., where
about 10,000 mergers have occurred among depository institutions
in the past fifteen years. While there is some evidence that some
commercial loan borrowers suffer when a local bank merges with a
bank from a different city [Keeton, 1996], the picture is clouded
because other suppliers such as finance companies are increasing
market shares. Consumer credit and real estate lending have been
trending up, as evidenced by the declining personal saving rate.
There has been rapid growth of "fringe" check cashing and pawn
shop operations which serve the poor. The shares of consumer and
real estate loans held by banks have not changed much, in part
because of rising rates at which they are being securitized. Bank
revenues from servicing securitized loans have been rising. Bank
profits as a percentage of assets in the United States hit fifty-
year highs in each of the past five years, in part because
securitized assets are not on their balance sheets. In the
preceding decade profits at U.S. banks had been unusually low, as
they currently are in Europe and Asia.
An important question is who will be most vulnerable as 
change continues? If one knew what was going to happen, a set of
new contracts could exist that would allow borrowers and lenders
to protect themselves. Unfortunately, there is great uncertainty
about what institutions and practices will survive and about
future regulatory environments and market conditions. Financial
firms that assume inflexible positions in their portfolios, as
happened when U.S. savings and loan associations made large
numbers of long-term, fixed interest rate, real estate loans, are 
vulnerable to change. The recent instability in Scandinavian
banks is another example. If banks avoid gaps by requiring that
real estate loans have floating interest rates, then the burden
is shifted to borrowers. One suspects that the game is to keep
shifting risks until they are concentrated in portfolios of
unsuspecting or inattentive investors. In the U.S. this group
appears to consist of households and managers of defined contri-
bution pension funds, who are not required to guarantee a result. 
Both have increasingly been relying on mutual funds, which also
do not promise a result. It remains to be seen how E.U. investors
will respond to events in the ongoing revolution in Europe.       
Trends in the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts are
illuminating, although much contaminated by movements in the
stock market. If one examines financial flows in the accounts for
households and nonprofit organizations over the past six years,these investors are moving away from currency and checkable
deposits; federal, state, and local government securities; and
especially corporate equities. They are shifting flows towards
all types of mutual funds and pension funds. Because corporate
equities are marked to market in Flow of Funds balance sheets, a
very different picture emerges in them. Assets of households and
nonprofit organizations are being increasingly concentrated in
corporate equities, all forms of mutual funds, pension funds, and
bank trust accounts. 
U.S. investors are shifting away from depository intermedi-
aries which tend to pay low interest rates. Money market mutual
funds provide liquidity and higher returns. They are increasingly
shifting equity and bond investments from their own portfolios
towards agents who manage pension funds and mutual funds. The
reasons for these trends are unclear, but surely the large
demands on time that are required to accumulate information and
manage a portfolio are important. Further, while overall market
volatility does not seem to have increased in proportion to stock
indices, individual stocks are always potentially volatile;
pooling one's resources in a mutual fund reduces exposure to
cross-sectional risk. Because of increased regulation of defined
benefit pension funds and greater labor market mobility, defined
contribution pension funds and institutionally managed investment
retirement accounts are becoming more attractive. It should be
emphasized that the changes are not a result of increased saving;
the saving rate out of disposable income is roughly at a fifty-
year low. Taking into account direct individual holdings and
holdings by mutual and pension funds, the net worth of individu-
als is more concentrated in equities than at any time during the
last fifty years. The ratio of equities to all credit market debt
at the end of the first quarter of 1998 was 67%, up from 34% at
the end of 1991.
Turning to the accounts of nonfinancial business, flows in
the past six years have largely been into miscellaneous assets
and liabilities, which are very ill-defined, but include foreign
direct investments and a heterogeneous group of unallocated
flows. "The unallocated items arise in the course of sector
accounting, when known totals of financial sources or uses of
funds are adopted as controls for the sector's financial ac-
counts. Any component of the totals that cannot be attributed to
one of the specific transaction accounts then falls residually
into the unallocated items." [Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1980, p. 47]  
Businesses have had negative flows from the issuance of new
equities because of buy-back programs and mergers. Borrowings
from banks and through conventional issuance of bonds, mortgages,
etc. have been steady. The distribution of assets and liabilitiesin balance sheets of nonfarm, nonfinancial corporations shows a
significant increase in the ratio of financial to tangible
assets, almost exclusively concentrated in miscellaneous finan-
cial assets. In addition to the explanation in the preceding
quotation, miscellaneous financial assets include revaluations of
equities that are issued in domestic and foreign markets. No
other substantive trends are apparent. In a nutshell, the flow of
funds accounts do not provide a clear picture about how nonfinan-
cial firms are faring in a world of increasing globalization.
If European unification were to lead to a similar configura-
tion in its flows of funds, massive restructuring would be re-
quired. European countries have a much higher ratio of bank
deposits to market value of equities than the U.S. There are
several reasons why such a difference exists. First, Western
Europe has at least a 600-year history of successful commercial
banking; limited liability and recognizably modern equity markets
have been around for less than 150 years. 
Second, a European country's financial structure is a costly
consequence of nationalism. Markets in each country are small and
protection was necessary if a country were to maintain viable
production units in a growing number of industries. In particular
a firm needed protection against the possibility of a takeover.
The value of an equity partly comes from the fact that it will
appreciate when a raider appears. In the United States it is
common for stock prices to rise 30% or more when a raider makes a
successful bid. Formidable institutions such as universal banks
and pyramid holding companies exist in Europe to deter raiders.
Equities are worth less when the chances for a successful take-
over are bleak. The social and private values of takeovers are
considerable and controversial. While restructuring is not always
successful, it can reorganize staff, production, and marketing to
be more supple and responsive to changing technologies and
demand. 
Third, more government ownership of a fixed total value of
production units means that the value of assets available for
private investors to own is smaller. Governments often either
control universal banks or are active participants on managing
committees of universal banks, which indirectly control and co-
ordinate production and investment in large sectors of an econo-
my. [Cf. Pecchenino, 1988]. Control by universal banks reduces
the speculative attractiveness of equities to investors. Banks in
the U.S. have been constrained from acting as universal banks by
the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, although its effective-
ness has been eroding in recent years. 
If the European Union succeeds in breaking down these
obstructions to competition, a wave of mergers of firms in a wide       All data in this table are either directly from or con- 1
structions from Tables 1, 2, and 3 in Barth, et al., 1997. The
first seven rows are from Table 1, the eighth from Table 2, and
the rest from Table 3. There are variations in total assets
across tables which imply that different populations of banks are
being summarized. James Barth has informed me that banking data
in Table 1 come from International Financial Statistics and
include all depository institutions in a country. Banking data in
Table 3 concern narrowly defined commercial banks and are from a
survey of countries' bank regulators.
swath of industries can be expected. The co-ordinating function
of banks will be much less important in the evolving Union and
the values of equities will appreciate correspondingly. The
recent sharp gains in European equity markets may partly be ex-
plained by expectations that this will occur. 
It is helpful to look at recent information that crudely
compares financial markets. Table 1 is constructed from informa-
tion provided by Barth, et al.; it reports data for 1993 for the
summed fifteen E.U. countries and the United States. Attention
should be directed to the last column of ratios which facilitates
comparisons. As can be seen, the E.U. has a slightly larger GDP
and a significantly larger population than the United States.
However, the financial structure of the two regions differs
radically. Banks are roughly six times as important as security
markets in Europe, relative to the United States. The seeming
exception, the percentage of world international debt securities
held, is misleading because it includes securities issued by
other E.U. countries. Barth, et al. reports that there were $2.04
trillion of world international debt securities and $19.72
trillion of OECD domestic securities outstanding. If one factors
in these relative magnitudes, the exception is inconsequential.
There are fewer private companies in Europe, which in part
reflects the large state ownership of firms in some countries.
The ratios for number of companies and market capitalization
suggests that corporations with publicly traded stock have
slightly smaller market values in the European Union.
Banking structure differences are also evident in the ratio
column. The relatively large number of U.S. banks is shrinking
rapidly as the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act takes
effect. A persistent difference between the U.S. and the E.U. is
the relatively large number of banking offices in Europe. The
                           Table 1
1993 SUMMARY MEASURES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE U. S.1
    ratio       IFS data for the U.S. segregate bank assets from thrift 1
institution assets and money market fund assets. If these are added
to U.S. bank assets, the ratio of E.U. to U.S. banking assets falls
to 2.17. The E.U. countries had no reported substantial correspond-
ing omissions in the IFS accounts. The thrust of the discussion in
the text is unaffected by this worst-case scenario correction.
       Data for the E.U. exclude Ireland. 2
Measure                       EU       US   EU/US
-----------------------------------------------------------------
   Percentage of World Population          6.73     4.69    1.43
   Percentage of World GDP   29.06    27.08  1.07
   Percentage of World Banking Assets     42.99    13.18    3.26 1
   Percentage of World Equity Market 
Capitalization                       20.29    36.78    0.55
   Percentage of World International 
Debt Securities   42.24     8.68    4.87
   Percentage of OECD Domestic            
Debt Securities   27.56    47.38    0.58
   Percentage of World Open-End Invest-
ment Company Assets   32.44    50.24    0.65
   Number of Domestic Companies (thous.)   4.46     7.25    0.62 2
   Number of Commercial Banks (thous.)     2.60    10.97    0.24
   Number of Banking Offices (thous.)     98.56    54.13    1.82
   Total Bank Deposits (trils. of U.S.$)   4.40     2.75    1.60
   Total Bank Loans (trillions of U.S.$)   4.51     2.15    2.10 
   Staff per Bank (in hundreds)            6.72     1.36    4.94
relatively large number of branches and small number of banks in
Europe has resulted in a very large number of employees per bank.
Barth, et al. reports that three-firm concentration ratios are
much higher in every European country than they are in the United
States. With the exceptions of Luxembourg and England, which are
essentially international banking centers, these three-firm
concentration ratios are also typically much higher than corre-
sponding 1994 concentration ratios in each of the fifty U.S.
states and the District of Columbia [Amel, p. 13]. Finally,
although not in the table it is important to note that a large
fraction of banking assets in Europe is held in banks that are
government owned.
III  Banks and Other Lenders in Capital Markets:
Banks, stockholders, and other lenders play distinctive
roles in guiding production decisions and the allocation of       No data were reported for Ireland. 1
resources in every economy. As has been stressed by Bulow and
Shoven [1978] and by corporate finance textbooks [Cf. Copeland
and Weston, 1988], these groups have different contractual claims
on the revenue streams of corporations. The differences are
especially sharply drawn when firms are in financial difficulty
and, therefore, always matter in an uncertain world where the
possibility of failure is present. To an important extent, the
distinctiveness among claims by banks, stockholders, and bond-
holders depends upon legal mechanisms for resolving claims when
firms are unable to meet their financial obligations. 
It is not feasible here to examine these differences in
detail. However, one may crudely group the United Kingdom and
Ireland and note that their institutions are rather similar to
those in the U.S., which all have a common origin in English
common law. A second crude grouping, based roughly on their
origins in Roman law, consists of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain,
Portugal, Austria, Germany, and possibly Luxembourg. The remain-
ing countries, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and
Greece, have elements of both systems and also their own distinc-
tive traditions. One can reasonably dispute this crude classifi-
cation, but it will guide the ensuing discussion.
Using data from Table 1 in Barth, et al., this classifica-
tion has a curious empirical echo. Sweden and the U.K. had the
highest ratios of percentage of world equity market capital-
ization relative to their percentage of world banking assets in
the E.U. in 1993; the next highest countries in order are the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland.  Stock ownership and market 1
capitalization are relatively higher for countries with a weaker
Roman law tradition. The ratio of market capitalization to GNP is
highest for the two international financial centers, Luxembourg
and the U.K.; the next highest E.U. countries in terms of this
measure are the Netherlands and Sweden. There is no apparent
relation between the proposed groupings and the ratio of domestic
debt securities to GNP.
Why do the Roman law countries have such relatively large
banking sectors and such low market capitalization? I suggest
that in such countries control of enterprises is organized in a
manner to avoid conflicts that might result in litigation. For
example, universal banks have control that is exercised through
lending decisions, voting rights, and representation on corpora-
tion committees. Universal banks help to avoid conflicts amongst
investors with different claims on income streams, because they
partly encompass them all. 
Government owned or sponsored enterprises do not haveprivate stockholders that might contest streams of revenues.
Bonds that such enterprises issue are likely to have near sover-
eign debt standing. Bank loans are likely to originate from
government owned banks or benefit from government guaranties.
Defaults will be avoided by bailouts.
Firms that are controlled through pyramid holding structures
are designed to minimize corporate raiding. Groups of enterprises
held by pyramid structures can lend to one another and borrow
from banks that are in the group. Like universal banks, conflicts
of interest among stockholders, bondholders, and banks are almost
reduced to squabbles within a family. This mechanism is not
always perfect in the case of very large firms, as Penati and
Zingales have lucidly described in the case of the Ferruzzi
reorganization [1997]. In that case major creditors took posses-
sion of the firm and its assets and arranged a settlement that
required a sizeable redistribution of wealth; this outcome was
possible because of a legal threat from insolvency that would
have activated "Prodi's Act" of 1979 and substantially weakened
the claims of creditors. The risks latent in financial restruc-
turing of large enterprises are very high in Italy. 
Failures occur in all economies, but costs of their resolu-
tions may be sensitive to the legal system in a country. There is
an enormous recent literature about restructuring and/or liqui-
dating firms in financial difficulty. Legal redress through the
courts is costly and time consuming; resolutions have a number of
consequences that are not transparently desirable [Cf. Bulow and
Shoven]. A conjecture that requires examination is that financial
contracts are relatively more difficult to litigate in Roman law
systems and that outcomes are less predictable. It is a main-
tained hypothesis in this paper.
Further, disclosure requirements of corporations having
outstanding securities in Europe are less demanding than in the
United States. Relatively few European securities trade as ADRs
on the New York Stock Exchange, in part because issuing firms are
unwilling to disclose required information. With less informa-
tion, an investor is exposed to greater risk. A second conjecture
that requires examination is that representative investors have
less information about securities traded in the E.U. than those
traded in the United States. If so, then investors have a weaker
case when seeking legal redress. Because stocks have some charac-
teristics of a call option and because such options have greater
value when uncertainty is greater, uncertainty could conceivably 
increase the market value of European equities. This possibility
is very implausible in Europe where universal banks and pyramid
structures control firms; the option cannot be effectively
exercised. It is a maintained hypothesis in the present paper
that representative investors have less information. Banks originated as lenders to small enterprises. They
continue to be the most important suppliers of funds to small
businesses because costs of gathering and processing information
are very high. A firm must reach a certain size before these
costs can be recovered by underwriters of market securities. Some
financing is effected through trade credit and franchises, but
banks continue to be principal suppliers in most countries. Banks
typically have a continuing relationship with individuals and
firms that affords low cost surveillance. Also, because small
businesses tend to do business locally there are other informa-
tion channels which a bank can easily monitor.  
Small firms are ubiquitous and difficult to quantify. Small
firms may be unincorporated or registered as corporations. A
proprietor may borrow funds and use them both for personal
consumption and business development. Small firms may be secre-
tive in order to avoid taxes and regulations and in order to
maximize returns from research and development. It is difficult
to argue that small firms and their needs for bank loans are more
frequent in one country or another. I know of no comprehensive
empirical evidence about this question across E.U. countries, but
fragmentary information exists for manufacturing across a few
countries [van Ark and Monnikhof, 1996] and about all sectors on
a few dates for Italy, Germany, and France [Cannari, et al.,
1993]. The general picture seems to be that there is a tendency
for the number of small firms to grow relatively to the number of
other firms in European manufacturing; in Italy the same is true
for all enterprises. If anything, these trends in firm size
suggest a growing advantage for banks as a source of funds. 
In the United States a different pattern exists in data re-
leased by the Small Business Administration [1988 and website].
Between 1976 and 1986, the number of firms with fewer than 20
workers grew 12%, firms with fewer than 100 workers and fewer
than 500 workers each grew 14%, and firms with more than 500
workers grew 28%. Between 1988 and 1995, the number of firms with
fewer than 20, 100, and 500 workers each grew 8%, while the
number with more than 500 grew 20%. The same pattern appears when
examining establishments. If large firms borrow more in security
markets than from banks, one might predict a growing disadvantage
for banks in the U.S.
Barth, et al. reports that the E.U. countries held $860
billion of international debt securities and $5,433 billion of
domestic debt securities in 1993. Corresponding data for the U.S.
were $177 and $9,341 billion respectively. Smith reports that the
total value of bonds outstanding at the end of 1996 in the E.U.
was $7,361 billion; $4,153 was public sector debt, $2,253 was
corporate and other bonds, and $968 billion was international
debt. It is unclear if these totals include private placements.From the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts, $2,784 billion in corporate
bonds and $7,686 billion of government, agency, and mortgage-
backed government and agency securities were outstanding at the
end of 1996. 
The difference in corporate bonds outstanding may seem
modest, but the larger E.U. economy had borrowed 20% less than
the United States. There seems to be more self-financing and less
bond debt in the European Union. Lower leverage is a sensible
strategy if the costs of litigation needed to resolve insolven-
cies are larger in Europe. Further, it is not clear from avail-
able data what fraction of European debt is being held by univer-
sal banks and their affiliates. Such holdings are less likely to
culminate in hostile litigation.
New equity issues are less a source of new funds than a
mechanism for sharing ownership in an enterprise, particularly in
the case of Europe where many state-owned firms are being privat-
ized. Between 1987 and 1996 U.S. stock market capitalization rose
from $2.6 to $8.5 trillion; during the same span capitalization
in the future E.U. rose from $1.56 to $4.39 trillion [Interna-
tional Financial Corporation, 1997]. There has been an extraordi-
nary acceleration between 1993 and 1996 in both areas; valuation
grew 55% in the European Union and 65% in the United States.
Despite privatization, the ratio of E.U. to U.S. valuations has
been steadily falling. Over this same period, the annual value of
shares traded on exchanges grew by about 180% in the European
Union and about 194% in the United States. In 1996 the turnover
rate of shares was higher in the U.S. than in every E.U. country
except Germany and Spain.
To summarize, banks continue to be the major source of funds
in Europe. The universal bank has many advantages that are not
likely to be displaced in the next few years. Bond and equity
markets have been expanding rapidly, but if anything they are
falling further behind their U.S. counterparts through 1996. 
IV  Growth and the Composition of Financial Flows:
The hypothesis that an improving financial structure facili-
tates growth has long standing in economics. A number of early
postwar theoretical contributions [Gurley and Shaw, 1956; Tobin
and Brainard, 1963; and Tobin, 1965] suggested how financial
intermediaries might affect growth in a market economy. To the
extent that growth and capital accumulation are enhanced by high
saving rates, there is a role for financial institutions and
markets that offered convenient assets for potential savers.
Many countries did not subscribe to this financial marketsapproach. The early successful example of Japan suggested that
growth could be improved by overriding market allocations of
credit and channeling bank funds to specific targets chosen by a
planning group. In Italy and other European countries, regulators
imposed many impediments to consumer borrowing for houses and
durable goods. They accepted that saving enhanced prospects for
growth, but wanted to make sure that funds were "productively"
allocated. Europe and Japan did prosper with this managed market
system, but it began to collapse in the mid 1980s when their
currencies began to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. They
actually had a bit of a free ride when the dollar appreciated
against them between 1979 and 1985, because the U.S. had effec-
tively priced itself out of world goods markets. 
Roughly at the outset of the European Monetary System in
1979, which itself can be interpreted as a response to the
preceding collapse of the value of the U.S. dollar against the
Deutsche mark and the French franc, the managed market system
would begin to become an intellectually unsound basis for enhanc-
ing growth. Credit cards could override restrictions on loans to
consumers. In the spirit of the Mundell/Fleming model, if mone-
tary policy were used to stabilize exchange rates in the EMS and
restrictions on capital flows were weakening, monetary policy
could not also be used to foster investment projects in any
single country. Monetary policy and financial institutions and
markets can foster growth in the E.U., but that is a much later
chapter.
Very recently there has been renewed interest in the ques-
tion of how banks and financial markets can influence economic
growth. Space does not allow a thorough discussion of this
interesting work [Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales,
1998]. However, both of these empirical studies, based on data
from many countries, conclude that banks and equity markets are
important contributors to economic growth. 
If one confines attention to the E.U. countries and the U.S.
in recent years, it is difficult to see much evidence of such a
connection. Stock market capitalization in different countries
has been quite volatile from year to year and not strongly
correlated across countries in the past decade. As noted above,
U.S. corporations are actually reducing the number of shares
outstanding; equities have become a negative source of funding.
After the current wave of privatizations in Europe, mergers are
likely to produce a similar picture there. 
Table 2 reports nominal GDP, bank credit to the private
sector, and their ratio in various years from 1980 through 1996.
The ratio can be interpreted as an inverse "credit velocity."
There are several points to be made from this table, where "NA"implies either a measure was not available or a significant
redefinition of a measure made data noncomparable over time.
First, there is considerable heterogeneity in the ratio across
countries and over time. Second, the ratio for the U.S. is the
sum of private claims held by banks, thrift institutions, and
money market funds. This augmented U.S. ratio is close to the
median of E.U. countries. The "pure" commercial bank ratio would
be about 30-40% smaller. Third, a high ratio of stock market
capitalization does not imply a low ratio of bank credit to GDP.
Capitalization is in no sense a substitute for credit; capital-
ization is a forward looking ownership claim on future net income
and credit is a liability which must be serviced before net
income can be calculated. Fourth, banking crises in the Scandina-
vian countries caused an increase in the credit velocity after
1990. Finland and Sweden were the only two countries to have a
negative change in real per capita income in the decade ending in
1995. This suggests that a lack of financial services can retard
growth. 
The three highest annual growth rates in real per capita
income between 1985 and 1995 were for Ireland (5.2%), Portugal
(3.7%), and Spain (2.6%); their velocities are roughly trendless.
With the exception of Greece, these countries have the lowest per
capita income in the European Union; the OECD predicts [Andrews,
1998] similar high rates for these countries in 1998. While there
continue to be seriously lagging areas of Europe, such as the
Mezzogiorno, European unification has succeeded in reducing per
capita income differentials across countries. In this sense
movement towards a common currency has improved growth. It is too
early to say how financial market unification has affected the
overall E.U. growth rate. 
Finally, the countries with the lowest velocities (highest
ratios of bank claims to GDP) are Austria, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These five countries had 68%
of E.U. GNP in 1995 and have velocities that have generally been
trending down. Bank credit appears to becoming even more impor-
tant as unification proceeds.  
V   Conclusion:
Economic theory and recent empirical evidence strongly
suggest that the presence of strong financial intermediaries and
efficient securities markets facilitates economic growth. Securi-
ties markets lessen the burden of ownership by allowing stocks
and bonds to be easily shifted among investors. Banks perform a
similar function by severing the direct connection between
ultimate creditors and debtors.Universal banks in the E.U. seem destined to continue as
major players because of trends in firm size and because of their
ability to intervene actively in management and in decisions
about a firm's finances. They have broader powers than U.S.
banks; these powers are especially valuable in a legal system
which is not based so much on precedent and timely resolution as
on inflexible prepositioning (interdicts?) and case-by-case
adjudication (actions?) by magistrates. The value comes from
their ability to avoid litigation which may be a very long
process including a sequence of appeals. 
Private sector corporate bonds are present in smaller
quantities in the European Union than in the United States. An
unknown fraction of outstanding bonds are in the portfolios of
universal banks and affiliated enterprises. To some extent both
the smaller amount and their location reflect the difficulty of
achieving redress through the legal system. Bonds always incorpo-
rate a put option when default is possible; in the European Union
the probability distribution needed to price that option is less
knowable than it is in the United States. Government bonds and
quasi-government agency securities also exist in greater quantity
in the U.S. because of Reagan era deficits and earlier fiscal
problems. 
The market value of equities is much higher in the United
States, because the option value from takeovers is higher there
and because of the relatively larger share of public sector
ownership of industrial firms and utilities in the European
Union. The market value of equities will rise in the E.U. as
privatization continues. However, market capitalization is likely
to continue to be less than in the U.S., because of the difficul-
ty of launching hostile takeovers. Hostile takeovers will not
often succeed in the E.U. because of the persistence of pyramid
holding companies and universal banks that are likely to side
with existing management. Petitions to magistrates are not
promising as resolutions to a fight.
The two questions raised above in Section III need to be
explored in future work. They are:
1. Are financial disputes litigated under modern forms of
Roman law more costly to resolve and less predictable in outcome
than under English common law?
2. Do representative investors have less information about
securities issued in the European Union than those issued in the
United States?Madison, Wisconsin July 10, 1998                  Table 2
            NOMINAL GDP, BANK CLAIMS ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND THEIR RATIOS: 1980 - 1996
                              nominal gross domestic product                bank claims on private sector                ratios  (bank claims / GDP)
Country               1980     1986    1990    1993    1996      1980    1986    1990     1993    1996     1980   1986   1990   1993   1996
Austria                  995     1423    1801     2124     NA         754     875    1683     2019      NA        .76      .61      .93      .95    NA
Belgium               3519     5119    6475     7317    8673       NA     NA     2329     5011    5529       NA      NA     .36      .68      .64 
Denmark               374       667      799       874    1010         94     252       429       318      331       .25      .38      .54      .36      .33
Finland                  193       358      515       482      569        90      231       450       399      348       .47      .65      .87      .83      .61
France                  2808    5069    6452      7023    7872    1336    4056     6261     6505    6419       .48      .80      .97      .93      .82
Germany              1479    1925     2429     3155    3540     1155    1666     2311    3046    3714       .78      .87      .95      .97     1.05
Greece                  1711   5515   13143   21106  29576       517    1668     2407    3870     6811      .30      .30      .18      .18       .23
Ireland                  9361 18877   27190   32218   42104     2948   4685     7804    9545   15012      .31      .25       .29      .30      .36
Italy                        390     900     1311     1550     1874      137     289       688      902       970      .35      .32       .52      .58      .52
Luxembourg           148     223       300       487      NA       112      160        72      NA        390      .76      .72       .24     NA     NA
Netherlands            337     429       516       579       662       225     291      427      519       699       .67      .68       .83     .90     1.06
Portugal                 256    4420     9621   13210   16523       688   1544    4031    6932   10298       .55      .35       .42     .52       .62
Spain                  15209  32324   50145   60934   73661   10714 18260  35097  43052    52367      .70      .56       .70      .71      .71
Sweden                  525      946     1360     1446     1678       219     383      791      631       623      .42      .40       .58      .44      .37
United Kingdom     230      383       551       631      742        NA     NA      645      707       912      NA     NA     1.17    1.12    1.23 
United States        2684    4269     5744     6553     7636     1725   3055     4050   4090     5026      .64      .72        .71     .62      .66
    Note: GDP data and bank claims are expressed in local currencies; all data are from International Financial Statistics, various issues.
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